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 ABSTRACT 
 
This study sought to replicate and extend what little is known about the effect of 
misleading post-event information (aka the misinformation effect) with regards to 
facial identification. One-hundred eleven undergraduate students viewed a video of a 
staged crime and were then given newspaper articles containing misleading, non-
misleading, or no information about the appearance of the perpetrator. Participants 
were then tested with either a target-absent line-up, where all individuals matched the 
misleading description of the perpetrator, or a target-present line-up, where all 
individuals matched the non-misleading description. Two main findings were 
obtained. First, misinformation did not impair line-up performance. However, 
participants receiving any (even misleading) facial information outperformed those 
participants receiving no information. These results suggest that in some cases, verbal 
misinformation may facilitate memory. Furthermore, they suggest that while 
perceptual misinformation may not easily impair visual memory, contextual 
information can. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In October 2002, an unknown sniper held the Washington, D.C. area under a 
blanket of fear as individuals were randomly gunned down while they went about their 
daily lives. After the shooting of FBI criminal analyst Linda Franklin, authorities 
seemed to have caught a break. A witness at the scene of the shooting came forward 
saying that he had seen the shooter, an olive-skinned man who seemed to be Middle 
Eastern and who was driving a white van. The witness appeared very confident in his 
report, claiming to have gotten “a good look at the guy” (Leinwald & Johnson, 2002). 
As it turned out, after his report was released and published in the media, it was found 
that he was incorrect, and may have possibly purposefully mislead police (McKelway 
& Bradley, 2002). When the case was finally closed, it turned out that the sniper was 
not a lone olive-skinned Middle Eastern man in a white van, but two African 
American men in a blue Chevy Caprice (Dao, 2003). 
 Clearly an inaccurate witness, whether purposefully deceiving or simply 
mistaken, may cause problems for law enforcement. Following false leads can waste 
valuable law enforcement time and energy and may lead investigators away from the 
actual perpetrator. Inaccurate information may cause an additional problem when the 
case is highly publicized or where there are multiple possible witnesses, such as the 
D.C. sniper shootings. In these cases, the publicized inaccurate report could taint the 
memories of other potential eyewitnesses. Whether or not this is an actual possibility 
is an empirical question, however, despite decades of research on eyewitness behavior 
it has yet to be adequately answered.  
Although the legal system highly regards eyewitness reports, research both in 
lab and in the field has shown that these reports are far from perfect. Research on 
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convicted individuals exonerated through DNA evidence shows that the bulk of 
wrongful convictions are caused by mistaken eyewitness identifications (Wells, et al, 
1998). Estimates suggest that as many as  4,500 mistaken identifications result in 
wrongful convictions each year (Cutler & Penrod, 1995). In addition to research in the 
field, psychological research in the lab has shown that there are a number of factors 
associated with errors in eyewitness memory (see Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Loftus & 
Hoffman, 1989; Wells & Olson, 2003 for reviews).  
One such factor often associated with errors in eyewitness memory is 
misleading post-event information, a finding commonly referred to as the 
misinformation effect. In the standard paradigm for studying the misinformation effect, 
participants view a video or series of slides depicting a staged crime and then read a 
narrative or answer questions containing some inaccurate information about the event. 
The participants are then given a surprise memory test asking them to either recognize 
or recall the information from the video or slides. Generally, a significant portion of 
participants will report having observed information that was only suggested to them.  
The misinformation effect has been reliably replicated in both children (e.g. Ceci, 
Ross, & Toglia, 1987) and adults (e.g. Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994; 
Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).  
The findings on the misinformation effect suggest that indeed exposure to 
inaccurate information about the appearance of a perpetrator may negatively affect an 
eyewitness’s memory of the perpetrator. However, such a conclusion may be 
injudicious. Most previous research on the misinformation effect has not focused on 
line-up identifications, but rather has been primarily concerned with actions or aspects 
of events (e.g. “Did the man steal a wrench or a hammer?” “Did the visitor tear the 
teddy bear?”). Because there are a number of differences between the standard 
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misinformation paradigm and line-up identifications, these previous studies may be 
uninformative about the effect of misinformation on line-up identifications. 
 One major difference between line-up identification and studies on the 
misinformation effect is the modality of misinformation and test presentation. In 
nearly all misinformation studies, post-event information and tests are presented 
verbally (e.g. participants are asked in a written test, “Did you see X or Y” rather than 
shown X and Y visually and asked which one they saw). In line-up identification, 
though, the test is of visual, not verbal memory. According to principals of transfer 
appropriate processing, or encoding specificity (e.g. Tulving, 1983), when study and 
test conditions match, accessing the memory trace during test is easier. In the standard 
misinformation paradigm, the misinformation and test modes match thus making the 
misinformation easier to retrieve. However, in a line-up test the original image and the 
test match, since both are visual in nature, making the original image more accessible 
and consequently possibly less susceptible to interference from verbal misinformation. 
 Research findings are mixed in regards to the effects of verbally presented 
misinformation of visual memory. Intraub and Hoffman (1992) found that when 
participants read descriptions of complex scenes they had previously not seen and then 
viewed pictures of those scenes, they reported that they had in fact viewed the 
pictures. This suggests that the verbal information presented to them created a false 
visual memory of the previously unseen picture. Similarly, Braun and Loftus (1998), 
found that participants verbally misled about the color of an object visually chose the 
misleading color from color wheel more than non-misled participants. However, 
Yamashita (1996) was unable to find a significant misinformation effect when 
participants were given either a standard misinformation test or a visually presented 
test. This led Yamashita (1996) to suggest, as one may expect from the transfer 
appropriate processing principle, that in a visual recognition test, the original visual 
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memory is more likely to be recovered, and thus misinformation may not effectively 
interfere with memory. Given the somewhat contradictory findings from only a few 
studies, it is not yet clear if visual recognition tests are unaffected by verbal 
misinformation. 
In addition to differences in test modality, face recognition functions 
differently than other types of object recognition. Unlike other forms of visual 
processing, faces are more likely to be recognized as undifferentiated wholes, with 
little part decomposition (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998, Rakover, 2002). In 
general, configural information (spatial relations and proportions between features) is 
more important for face recognition than featural information (isolated features such 
as eyes, nose, and hairline) (Bartlett, Searcy, & Abdi, 2003; Rakover, 2002).1 
Configural characteristics of faces may be more difficult to describe in words, 
therefore those characteristics that are easily verbalized may be less important for 
recognizing faces (Dodson, Johnson, & Schooler, 1997). Because the misinformation 
paradigm requires the use of verbally presented information, and this information may 
be less important for face recognition, verbal misinformation may not have the same 
negative effect on faces that it has on other aspects of an event.  
Because of the difference in test modalities between line-up recognition and 
most misinformation studies, and the special nature of face processing, the effect of 
misinformation on faces must be directly tested and not merely inferred from previous 
                                                 
1 There is still some degree of controversy surrounding the exact mechanisms for facial recognition, 
and there are a number of competing theories currently postulated. However, it is generally agreed upon 
that face recognition is different than other forms of object recognition and that configural information 





research on the misinformation effect. However, despite the vast literature on 
eyewitness’s ability to correctly identify faces (see R.C.L. Lindsay & Pozzulo, 1999; 
Wells, et al., 2000; and Wells & Olson, 2003 for recent reviews), the effect of 
misinformation on facial identifications has remained largely unexplored. Only two 
published studies to date have explicitly looked at this relationship (Loftus & Greene, 
1980; Searcy, Bartlett, & Memon, 2000).  
Loftus and Greene (1980) showed participants a slide depicting a group of 
people at an outdoor party, and then presented them with a description purportedly 
written by a professor who had viewed the slide. In one version of the description the 
man in the picture was erroneously described as having a moustache, while the other 
version was neutral in regards to facial hair. Finally, participants were given a 12 
person target-absent (the perpetrator was not present) line-up where half of the men 
had moustaches and half did not. Loftus and Green (1980) found that the proportion of 
participants choosing someone with a moustache was greater in the misinformation 
condition compared to the neutral information condition. Similarly, Searcy et al (2000) 
found that participants misinformed that a previously viewed culprit had a chipped 
tooth were more likely to choose the single individual with a chipped tooth from a 
target-absent line-up, compared to participants who had not received this 
misinformation. 
 While these studies provide tantalizing evidence that misinformation can 
negatively impact line-up identification accuracy, they are problematic. One major 
problem is that the line-ups in both of these studies were biased. According to 
guidelines published by the U.S. Department of Justice (Technical Working Group, 
1999), line-up foils (those individuals in the line-up who are not the suspect) should 
resemble the suspect on significant features and should, when possible, fit the 
witness’s description of the perpetrator. If this is not possible, key distinctive features 
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should be masked in the suspect and all foils. Therefore, if the perpetrator was 
described as having a beard or a chipped tooth then all of the individuals in the line-up 
should have this characteristic, or in the case of the tooth, the characteristic could be 
masked. Using biased line-ups in research tests participants in a situation that may not 
resemble actual line-up identification situations thus reducing the external validity of 
these previous results. 
Additionally, having only one individual with the unusual characteristic, such 
as a chipped tooth, as in Searcy et al (2000), makes that particular individual stand out. 
Similarly, in creating a line-up where exactly half of the members differ from the other 
half on a single identifiable characteristic, as in Loftus and Green (1980) , attention 
may be drawn to this particular characteristic. Thus, by using biased line-ups the 
researchers may have created demand characteristics that influenced the participants’ 
choices. For example, participants in Loftus and Green’s misinformation condition 
may have noticed that moustaches were important to the study, remembered 
something about moustaches from the post-event description, and thus chose the 
individual with the moustache. In order to test participants with unbiased line-ups 
while still testing for the effects of misinformation, participants may be tested with an 
unbiased target-absent line-up where all foils match the misinformed description. In 
this case, the critical test is not whether participants pick a particular individual from 
the line-up, but if they pick any individual from the line-up. As of yet, this particular 
test has yet to be conducted. 
 Furthermore, the previous studies test misinformation for a single salient 
characteristic. In fact, in both Loftus and Green (1980) and Searcy et al (2000), the 
single characteristic was the only information about the appearance of the perpetrator 
that the participants received. These studies therefore, are uninformative about 
situations, such as the D.C. sniper case, where a witness provides a description of the 
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wrong person (opposed to a relatively accurate description that varies only slightly 
from the true perpetrator). This is problematic for both practical and theoretical 
reasons. As alluded to above, receiving a mistaken single salient characteristic may 
not be the type of circumstance that witnesses encounter in real life. Inaccurate 
descriptions may come about because a witness of the crime confuses an innocent 
bystander with the perpetrator. Additionally, in many cases there are no witnesses to 
the crime itself, but witnesses may have seen a suspicious individual near the place 
and time that a crime occurred. However, this “suspicious individual” may simply be 
an innocent party at the wrong place and the wrong time. Furthermore, characteristics 
such as facial hair and hairstyle are easily changed by a real life perpetrator, and thus 
eyewitnesses are often instructed to ignore such characteristics (Technical writing 
group, 1999).  
 Use of a single salient characteristic is theoretically problematic as well. Facial 
processing may switch from configural to featural processing when participants are 
oriented to focus on specific characteristics opposed to the face as a whole (Dodson et 
al, 1997; Fallshore & Schooler, 1995). Therefore, when participants are given a single 
characteristic to focus on, they may switch their processing to the featural level, 
searching for the specific characteristic mentioned in the post-event narratives as they 
examine the photos in the line-up. This switch may not happen when holistic person 
descriptions are given.  
The purpose of the present study was to replicate and extend what little is 
known about the misinformation effect in regards to line-up identifications. 
Specifically, we investigated the effect of misinformation presented in the form of a 
global physical description (opposed to a single salient characteristic) on identification 
from unbiased line-ups. We were interested in not only the effect of misinformation on 
identification from target-absent line-ups, as in previous studies, but also from target-
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present line-ups as well. The effect of misinformation may be minimized when an 
individual is faced with the choice of a previously viewed item versus a never before 
seen item (McClosky & Zaragoza, 1985), a situation analogous to choosing the correct 
person from a target-present line-up. Thus, the effects of misinformation may be 
different for target-absent versus target-present line-ups. 
While the preceding discussion has focused primarily on accuracy, it is not the 
only variable examined in eyewitness literature; eyewitness confidence has also 
received much attention. Although jurors and the U.S. judiciary may highly value the 
confidence that an eyewitness has in his or her report (Wells, R.C.L. Lindsay, & 
Ferguson, 1979), confidence is not necessarily related to accuracy (Leippe, 1980; 
Robinson & Johnson, 1996; Wells, et al., 2000) or is only predictive under certain 
specific conditions (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). In terms of the 
misinformation effect, research has shown that when misleading post-event 
information has been presented, individuals may be highly confident yet quite 
inaccurate (Loftus, et al, 1978). However, the effect of misinformation on confidence 
ratings has not been specifically examined in relation to line-up identifications. 
Therefore, in addition to measuring the effects of misinformation on identification 
accuracy, we were also interested in its effects on confidence. 
 In this study, participants viewed a video of a staged crime. They were then 
presented with misleading, non-misleading, or no information regarding the 
appearance of the perpetrator. Next, participants were presented with either a target-
absent line-up or a target-present line-up. The line-ups were constructed so that all 
individuals in the target-absent line-up matched the misleading description, and all 
individuals in the target-present line-up matched the non-misleading description (and 
thus the perpetrator). By constructing our line-ups in this manner, we were able to test 
for negative effects of misinformation on both target-absent and target-present line-
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ups while keeping the line-ups unbiased. After choosing the perpetrator from the line-
up, participants reported the confidence of their decisions and provided the source of 
their memories. If global misinformation of a face impairs identification memory by 
causing participants to remember the perpetrator to be more like the misleading 
description they received, then we would expect participants to fail to reject the target-
absent line-up by saying that the perpetrator is not there, as all the individuals in this 
line-up match the misinformation they received. Additionally, if there is genuine 
memory impairment, we may also expect participants to fail to choose the actual 
perpetrator from a target-present line-up since he does not resemble the individual 
described in the misleading description.  
  




Participants were 124 undergraduate students at a large Northeastern research 
university. Eighteen participants were excluded from the data analysis because they 
suspected the research hypotheses during the suspicion probe or they knew individuals 
shown in the video or line-ups. This led to a final sample of 106 participants. The final 
sample was predominately female (N = 80) with a mean age of 20.27 years (Range = 
18 – 27 years). The majority were Caucasian (N = 72), while the remainder were 
Asian (N=23), Hispanic (N =7), African American (N=3), or unspecified (N = 1). 
Participants were recruited from Psychology courses, and were offered extra credit for 
their participation. All participants signed inform consent and were fully debriefed at 
the completion of the study. Thirty-four participants were randomly assigned to the 
misleading information group (N = 17 target-absent line-up), 35 to the non-misleading 
information group (N = 19 target-absent line-up), and 37 to the no information group 
(N = 17 target absent line-up).  
Materials 
 Video. A short 90 s video titled “A Busy Day” was produced for the purpose of 
the study. The video depicted a woman talking on the phone to her friend and leaving 
her house in a hurry in order to bring her friend a check. In the final scene of the 
video, the woman leaves her car running as she rushes to her friend’s house as a young 
Caucasian man approaches her car, enters the vehicle, and drives off. The perpetrator 
is shown on the film for approximately 13 s, and his face is always in view, though at 




 Line-up construction. Graduate students from the study university and 
undergraduate students at a nearby college were recruited to have their photographs 
taken in exchange for $5 and/or entry into a $50 raffle. All students were Caucasian 
males between 19 and 26 years old. Students were photographed with an Olympus® 
D-550 3.0 megapixel digital zoom camera at medium resolution in front of a uniform 
gray background. All photographs were digitally cropped in order make the 
background to face ratio consistent among all photographs. In all, 46 photographs 
were taken, including a photograph of the individual who portrayed the car thief.  
 Two separate descriptions, non-misleading and misleading, were written. The 
non-misleading description depicted key features of the perpetrator including age, 
build, hair color, hair-style, and facial features. The misleading description varied 
these characteristics. (See Appendix for descriptions). Based on published line-up 
recommendations (e.g. Wells, et al., 1998), line-ups were constructed by matching 
photographs to descriptions of the perpetrator rather than to a photo of the perpetrator. 
The target-present line-up was constructed by matching photographs to the non-
misleading description and the target-absent line-up was constructed by matching 
photographs to the misleading description. Three independent coders rated the 
similarity of each of the 46 photographs to each of the two descriptions on a 5-point 
scale. The coders were unaware of the identity of the perpetrator and the accuracy of 
the descriptions.  Mean similarity ratings were calculated for each photograph for each 
description. The six photographs with the highest mean for each description were 
included in the line-up for that description. Because the misleading description 
included the detail of a mole, the photographs were digitally touched up, using Adobe 
Photoshop to remove moles on target-present individuals, and add or enhance a mole 
on target-absent individuals. Two photographs were dropped from the target-present 
line-up based on pilot testing where one photo was deemed too blurry and the other 
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because most pilot testing participants said it was definitely not the perpetrator.  These 
photographs were replaced with the next two highest scoring photographs. 
 The line-up photographs were printed by a color laser printer on 4 in by 6 in 
paper and were placed in a fixed random order with the constraint in the target-present 
line-up that the perpetrator not be in the first or last position. This was done to avoid 
participant biases to simply pick the first or last individual from the line-up. The 
photographs were then mounted to a 3 ft by 1 ft sheet of blue poster board in two rows 
of three. 
Procedure 
 Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to investigate the 
factors that influence legal decision-making. They were informed that they would be 
receiving information about a crime through visual and written mediums, and then 
would be asked to answer questions “similar to those faced by legal professionals.” 
After this introduction, participants watched the video of the crime and completed a 10 
min distracter task (solving word puzzles). Following the distracter task, participants 
were then given two “newspaper articles,” prepared specifically for this study. The 
first described the theft of the car and the second described the capture of a suspect. 
Imbedded in the first article was either the misleading, non-misleading, or no 
information about the physical appearance of the thief; the second article was identical 
for all participants and contained no physical description of the car thief. Participants 
were allowed to read the articles at their own pace, and most took only a few minutes. 
Next, in accordance with the ostensible purpose of the study, participants were given 
the task of ranking various charges and sentences that the individual who was arrested 
with the crime could be given and deciding the likelihood that the individual would 
commit a similar crime again. This task took approximately 5 min. 
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 In the final task, the participants were asked to choose the person they saw 
steal the car in the video from a line-up. They were given the following instructions 
prior to viewing the line-up: 
“Now I am going to show you a line-up of individuals suspected of 
committing the car theft. Please do not pay attention to facial hair, hair 
style, or hair color, as this may have changed since the time of the 
event. Also, be aware that the person you saw may not be in the line-
up, so ‘not there’ is an option you have.” 
After responding to this question, participants were asked to rate their 
confidence in their choice on a 7-point scale, with 7 indicating very confident and 1 
indicating not at all confident. Finally, participants were told that they may have used 
multiple sources of information in making their line-up decision and to indicate 
separately whether or not they used firstly the video of the crime and secondly the 
newspaper article. This question was designed to test the source of their memories, 
and the order (video or newspaper) was counter-balanced across participants. For 
participants claiming to use both sources of information in making their decision, two 
additional confidence questions were asked. Participants were asked how confident 
they were that their choice reflected the person they saw in the video and how 
confident they were that their choice reflected the person they read about in the 
newspaper articles. These questions were asked in the same order that the source 
questions were asked. Participants were then probed for suspicion, fully debriefed, and 






Preliminary analyses found that gender and race were independent of accuracy, 
therefore, data was collapsed across genders and race in all further analyses.  
Line-up Accuracy  
To test for accuracy, all participants’ responses were coded to a dichotomous 
correct/incorrect variable. In the target-present line-up correct respondents were those 
who chose the perpetrator from the line-up. In the target-absent line-up correct 
respondents were those who said “not there.” Figure 1 depicts the percent correct by 
information and line-up group.  
In order to assess if receiving post-event information and type of line-up 
affected identification accuracy and if these two variables interacted, a logistic 
regression analyses was performed with accuracy (correct versus incorrect) as the 
outcome variable, and information group (misleading information, non-misleading 
information, no information), line-up group (target-present and target-absent), and an 
interaction term as categorical predictor variables. While a test of this model against 
the null model was statistically significant, χ2 (3) = 11.22, p < .05, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.14, the interaction term was not a significant predictor of outcome, Wald  = .08, p = 
ns. Therefore, a test of the simpler model without the interaction term was conducted. 
This model was statistically significant, χ2 (3) = 11.14, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .14. 
Planned contrasts showed that both the misleading information group and the non-





























Figure 1. Percent correct as a function of line-up and information group.
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 < .05 and Wald  = 3.80, p < .05 respectively.  However, these two groups did not 
differ from each other, Wald = .00, p = ns. Contrary to our expectations, the no 
information group performed the worst with a 24.3% accuracy rate. In contrast, the 
misleading and non-misleading information groups were nearly equally accurate with 
a 52.9% and 51.4% accuracy rate respectively. Planned contrasts also showed that the 
two line-up groups differed significantly, Wald = 5.19, p < .05.  Overall, participants 
viewing the target-absent line-up were more accurate than participants viewing the 
target-present line-up (50.9% accuracy compared to 28.3% accuracy). 
We next reran the same logistic model, aggregating the misleading and non-
misleading groups, to see if differences in accuracy were a function of receiving any 
information versus receiving none.  That model was also statistically significant, χ2 (2) 
= 11.14, p < .05, Nagelkerke R2 = .14.  This latter analysis further allows us to 
examine the effect of receiving any information versus none in terms of probability of 
accuracy.  An odds ratio of 2.83 for the information variable shows that receiving any 
information increased the odds of choosing accurately in a line-up over three times 
compared to receiving no information.   
Foil Choice 
 To assess if choice of non-target foils were distributed equally, two separate 
Chi-Square Likelihood Ratio analyses were conducted for each of the two line-ups. In 
the target-present line-up non-target choices were equally distributed among the other 
five foil choices, χ2 (4) = 7.58, p = ns. However, in the target absent line-up foil 
choices were not equally distributed, χ2 (5) = 79.69, p < .001. Inaccurate participants 
in this line-up condition chose photo number 3 a considerable number of the time 
(80.76%). Choice of this foil did not vary by information group, χ2 (4) = 3.73, p = ns.  
 To test if this photograph differed from the other photographs on its similarity 
to the target description, its mean similarity score was compared to the mean similarity 
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score of the other members of the target-absent line-up. There was no significant 
difference between the photo number 3 and the other members, t (4) = .48, p = ns. As 
an additional check, 3 independent raters rated the similarity of each of the line-up 
foils to the perpetrator on a 7-point Likert type scale. Again, photo number 3 was not 
rated more similar to the perpetrator than the other members of the target-absent line-
up, t (4) = 1.83, p = ns (M = 3.33 for photo number 3, M = 2.0, SD = .67 for other line-
up members). However, it was also not rated significantly less similar than the 
members of the target-present line-up, t (4) = .68, p = ns (M = 4.07, SD = .98 for line-
up members). Photo number 3, then, likely looked most like the perpetrator amongst 
the photographs in the target-absent line-up which led to his increased choice. 
However, this alone does not explain the pattern of results observed between the 
information groups, and is not considered problematic. 
Confidence 
To test whether or not confidence was related to accuracy a Pearson correlation 
was calculated between confidence and accuracy (scored 0 for incorrect and 1 for 
correct). As expected, confidence and accuracy were positively but not significantly 
correlated, r = .12, p =  ns.  
Because individuals receiving information were more accurate overall, and 
because they were provided more information which could potentially increase 
confidence, we were also interested in whether or not confidence was related to 
information group, and whether or not it interacted with accuracy. A 3 x 2 
(information by accuracy) between subjects analyses of variance (ANOVA) was 
calculated. There were no main effects for information group or accuracy, F (2,100) = 
2.05 p = ns, F (1,100) = 3.35, p = ns respectively, however there was a significant 
information group by accuracy interaction, F(2, 100) = 3.99, p < .05, observable in 
Figure 2. Three post-hoc independent samples t-tests were conducted, correcting for 
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multiple tests. Among individuals receiving non-misleading and no information, there 
was no significant difference between correct and incorrect participants in terms of 
confidence. However, among individuals receiving misleading information those 
individuals who were correct were significantly more confident than those who were 
incorrect, t (33) = 2.77, p < .05.  
Choosing versus Not There 
Because of the unexpected finding that receiving any information increased 
correct decisions, we were left to question whether the information groups simply 
differed on their willingness to make a choice of an individual from the line-ups 
opposed to simply saying “not there.” If these groups differed on their likelihood to 
choose someone from the line-up, they would be coded as more correct in the target-
absent line-up condition, even though their memories may not actually be any better. 
Although this would not be the case for the target-present line-up groups, the overall 
low accuracy for this condition still allows this explanation to serve as a possibility.  
To test this statistically, we conducted a logistic regression with information 
group entered as a categorical predictor variable and choosing someone from the line-
up opposed to saying “not there” as the outcome variable. This model was not 
statistically reliable, χ2 (2) = .11, p = ns, Nagelkerke R2 = .00. Therefore, the two 
groups did not differ in their willingness to choose. 
Source  
Overall, most participants said that they used the video in making their line-up 
decisions (N = 104). Fewer participants said they used the newspaper articles to make 
their decision (N = 27, 25.5%). Only two participants claimed to have relied on the 
newspaper articles exclusively; one from the no information group and one from the 
non-mislead information group. To test if use of newspaper articles varied by line-up 
or information group, a logistic regression was conducted predicting use of newspaper 
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articles (yes or no) from these two variables.. A test of this model against the null 
model was not statistically reliable, χ2 (3) = 5.67, p = ns, Nagelkerke R2 = .08. 
However, an examination of the Wald statistics showed that there was a statistically 
significant difference among the information groups, with the accurate information 
group using the newspaper articles more often than the no information group, Wald = 
5.09, p < .05. In order to assess if newspaper articles influenced accuracy irrespective 
of line-up or information group, a logistic regression test of this model was conducted. 
While this model was statistically significant, χ2 (4) = 11.69, p < .05, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.14, use of newspaper articles was not a significant predictor of accuracy, Wald = .54, 
p = ns. Therefore, while three post-event information groups differed on accuracy, this 
difference was not the result of participants consciously using the newspaper articles 
to inform their decisions.  
Finally, for participants who said they used both the video of the crime and the 
newspaper articles in making their line-up decisions (N = 25), the separate confidence 
ratings for these two media types were compared with a paired samples t-test. Results 
showed that confidence that their choice reflected the person they saw (M = 4.32, SD 
= 1.28) was higher than confidence that the results reflected the person they read about 
























































Two main findings were observed in this study. First, we were unable to 
replicate the misinformation effect previously observed in line-up identification 
studies (Loftus & Green, 1980; Searcy et al, 1980). Participants receiving misleading 
post-event information neither erroneously chose someone from the target-absent line-
up nor failed to choose the perpetrator from the target-present line-up any more than 
participants receiving non-misleading information. Secondly, receiving no facial 
information impaired line-up identification ability compared to groups that received 
information. Those participants receiving no information were more than two and a 
half times more likely to make mistakes in the line-up task than those who received 
any information. In addition to these two main results, we also confirmed findings 
from previous research that confidence and accuracy are not correlated with each 
other. 
The first major finding, that misleading post-event information did not impair 
line-up identification is not particularly surprising. Our failure to replicate is likely a 
result of using unbiased line-ups and providing more than a single salient 
characteristic. Given the complex nature of face recognition and the difference 
between misinformation and test modality, we expected from the outset that producing 
the misinformation effect in facial identification would be difficult. These findings 
provide further support for Yamashita’s (1996) suggestion that visual tests cue the 
original visual image and are not impaired by verbal misinformation. Additionally, 
since the misleading information group outperformed the no information group, it is 
likely that the misleading information, as well as the non-misleading information, 
served a facilitating function. When presented with the verbal information about the 
21 
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appearance of the perpetrator, participants were likely cued to think about his 
appearance and compare the verbal description to the visual image they had. While not 
statistically significant, mislead participants were actually more likely than non-
mislead participants to make correct line-up decisions, when compared to the no 
information group. This counter-intuitive finding has been supported by empirical 
research. When children are given misinformation about highly memorable events, 
this information produces better, rather than worse memories (Lee & Bussey, 1999; 
Peterson, Parsons, & Dean, 2004). Presumably the misleading information is 
recognized as inconsistent, and this process of comparing the misinformation to the 
original memory trace, and recognizing the inconsistency, strengthens the original 
trace. If participants in the misleading information condition recognized the 
information they were receiving was not correct, then they may be more likely to 
enhance their original memory and perform more accurately. 
There was some indication based on the confidence findings that the mislead 
group was conscious of the inconsistency in the information they received. While 
there was no difference between groups in accuracy, those who were correct and 
received the misleading information were more confident than those who received 
misleading information and were incorrect. Interestingly, unlike Loftus et al (1978), 
this was the only group that showed a significant relationship between confidence and 
accuracy. This significant relationship may reflect participants’ awareness that the 
description did not accurately match the perpetrator. Those participants who had a 
clear representation of the perpetrator may have been more confident in their correct 
response since they were able to easily reject the misleading description. However, 
those with weaker memory traces, and subsequently made mistakes, may have become 
confused by the misleading description which lowered their overall confidence.  
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The lack of misinformation effect on overall line-up accuracy does not 
necessarily indicate that person identification is immune from misleading post-event 
information. Rather it shows a single exposure to an inaccurate description read 
shortly after viewing a crime is not enough to produce the misinformation effect in 
person identification. Under different testing conditions, for example if 
misinformation and test modality were the same, we may see a misinformation effect. 
In many cases, composite sketches accompany verbal descriptions in media reports of 
crimes. Individuals exposed to an inaccurate composite sketch may incorporate this 
information into their visual memory of the perpetrator and show impairment in a line-
up identification task. In line with this suggestion, individuals who are exposed to mug 
shot books containing a suspect  prior to making a line-up identification make more 
false identifications, presumably because viewing the mug shots interferes with their 
memory of the perpetrator (Bringham & Caines, 1988; Gorenstein & Ellsworth, 1980). 
Alternatively, witnesses are also often asked to give verbal descriptions of the 
perpetrator before they are asked to make a line-up identification. While verbal 
misinformation may not hamper their line-up identification it may influence their 
verbal reports, which again poses concerns for law-enforcement. These are empirical 
questions that have yet to be answered, and have important implications for law-
enforcement. 
Our second major finding, that participants who received any facial 
information outperformed those who had not, was unexpected. Participants receiving 
facial information, be it accurate or inaccurate, performed similarly to other 
participants in line-up identification studies (see Cutler & Penrod, 1995 for review), 
however, those not receiving information performed exceptionally poor. Indeed, the 
pattern of results obtained in the no information condition looked as we initially 
expected the misleading information to look if the misleading information impaired 
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line-up accuracy. This suggests that those receiving information did not simply 
perform better than those who did not, but rather that those who did not receive 
information were somehow impaired. 
Why would reading a description of a previously viewed crime that did not 
include a physical description of the perpetrator impair line-up performance? One 
possibility is that the inclusion of additional contextual information about the event 
included in the newspaper articles (e.g. the suspect’s occupation and his name that 
were presented) may have increased the participants’ belief that he or she should be 
able to make a line-up decision, increasing the likelihood of choosing while not 
increasing accuracy. Previous research has found that receiving increased contextual 
information does lead to an increase in false identifications (Read, 1995, experiment 2; 
Searcy et al, 2000). This interpretation suggests that meta-memorial processes, rather 
than memorial processes are at work, indicating that participants’ errors reflect their 
beliefs about what they should remember rather than what they actually do remember. 
This explanation would only account for our data if the performance of the 
groups receiving facial details (e.g. perceptual information) was enhanced. In this 
case, we may argue that all groups received the same contextual information, 
increasing their willingness to choose, but the groups receiving the additional 
perceptual information who were cued to think about the appearance of the perpetrator 
had better memories and performed better. However, given that the no information 
group seems to have been impaired rather than the information groups being enhanced 
by the perceptual information, this meta-memorial explanation does not adequately 
explain our findings. Furthermore, if it did, we would expect there to be a difference in 
overall likelihood to choose, however we did not find this difference.  
 One possibility is that contextual information may also alter the participants’ 
original perceptual memory by inducing schema based memory distortions. Schemas 
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are organized knowledge structures that reflect an individual’s prior knowledge, 
experience, and expectations. When a person encounters an aspect of the environment 
that they have a schema for, this schema becomes activated (Neath, 1998). While 
schemas often serve as helpful memory shortcuts, memory distortions are likely to 
occur when a schema is activated, and particularly when the presented information is 
schema inconsistent (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; French & Richards, 1993; 
Tuckey & Brewer, 2003; Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000). For example, 
participants presented with a clock numbered with roman numerals, drew the clock 
with the four represented as IV, rather than as IIII as it actually was in the clock 
(French & Richards, 1993).  The IIII violated participants’ Roman numeral scheme, 
and thus their memory reports were inaccurate but more consistent with their existing 
schema. 
  In the present study, participants were told that the perpetrator was an auto-
mechanic and that he was suspected in other auto thefts. This information may then 
activate schemas of what criminal car mechanics look like. There is evidence showing 
that people do tend to have pre-conceived notions about what a criminals and 
individuals of various occupations look like (Goldstein, Chance, & Gilbert, 1984; 
Hellstrom & Tekle, 1994; Shephard, Ellis, McMurran, & Davies, 1978; Shoemaker, 
South, & Lowe, 1973) Given that our perpetrator was a slender, clean-cut, young man 
participants may not have viewed him as the prototypical car thief suspect. 
Unintentionally by varying the characteristics of the perpetrator, we may have 
provided a more stereotypical description of a suspect and consequently a target-
absent line-up that fit auto mechanic car thief schemas. Participants in the no 
information group then remembered the suspect to look more like the individuals in 
the target-absent line-up, and in particular more like the individual in the target-absent 
line-up who most closely resembled the perpetrator, and less like the actual perpetrator 
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and individuals in the target-present line-up. Similar to this, Shephard et al (1978) 
found that when participants were given information that a previously viewed person 
was a murderer opposed to a lifeboat captain, they constructed his face to be more 
unattractive in a Photofit task. Presumably, their stereotype of murderers as 
unattractive changed the original perceptual memory to be less attractive. Because 
participants in information groups were cued to think about the appearance of the 
perpetrator, and subsequently rehearsed this information, they were less influenced by 
the auto-mechanic car thief schema and thus performed better in the line-up task. 
 While perceptual misinformation may not lead to errors in line-up 
identification, these results suggest that contextual information can in fact induce 
errors. This effect is robust, even with a single presentation of contextual information 
shortly after viewing the crime. There may be a number of reasons that this is the case. 
First, unlike perceptual information, contextual information may not cue participants 
to actively rehearse their original memory of the face. Therefore, while it may induce 
the incorporation of erroneous information, this information is not checked by a 
strengthened visual image. Secondly, contextual information may induce holistic 
rather than featural rehearsal (Read, 1995). When the contextual information contains 
consistent details this holistic rehearsal leads to better memory as the individual 
rehearses an accurate holistic representation of the face. Thus, individuals asked to 
make trait judgments about a face recognize the face more accurately than individuals 
asked to make featural judgments (Coin & Tiberghiem, 1997). However, when this 
information is misleading, for example by suggesting that car thieves are not clean-cut 
young men, this holistic rehearsal may make the misleading information more likely to 
be incorporated into the participants’ memory. Because perceptual misinformation 
necessarily involves the use of easily verbalizable features, it seems to be less 
effective in producing a misinformation effect. 
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While these results are preliminary and have yet to be replicated, they do have 
some practical implications. Our findings imply that when releasing information to the 
media, concerns about tainting other potential witnesses should not enter into 
decisions as to whether or not a physical description of the potential perpetrator should 
be released. In terms of the memories of these other potential witnesses, it appears that 
the more of this information they are exposed to the better. Even misleading 
information may reinstate the witness’s original memory of the perpetrator. What 
appears to be a concern, however, is the release of contextual information that may 
trigger stereotypes of what the perpetrator should look like. This may not be a major 
concern for media outlets, given that when suspect information is released the identity 
of the suspect is often unknown, however, such information could potentially be 
incorporated into law enforcement interviews. Additionally, even in the absence of 
increased contextual information, beliefs simply about what a criminal looks like may 
distort eyewitness reports. When an innocent suspect fits a witness’s preconceived 
notion of what a criminal should look like, the innocent individual may have a greater 
chance of being falsely identified.  
 It has yet to be seen if misinformation harms verbal reports of a perpetrators’ 
appearance or if pairing verbal misinformation with a composite sketch reduces 
eyewitness accuracy. Since these situations are likely to be encountered in real life 
they should be tested before strong recommendations for real-world settings may be 
made. However, at a minimum the present study shows that we need not be overly 
concerned about the potential negative effects of misinformation about the appearance 
of a perpetrator on line-up identifications. While the inaccurate witness in the D.C. 
sniper case may have lead police down the wrong trail, it is not likely that his report 




Non-misleading: The witness described the suspect as a man in his mid twenties with 
short dark brown hair. He is described as small to medium build approximately 5’8” to 
6’ tall. “He was a slender guy and had prominent facial features. He had these full lips 
that really stood out to me. I’d definitely know him if I saw him again,” the witness 
said. 
 
Misleading: The witness has described the suspect as a man in his early twenties with 
very short light to medium brown hair. He is described as medium to heavy build 
approximately 5’8” to 5’10” tall. “He was a solid looking guy, a sturdy stocky build. 
He had a little facial fair, not a beard or anything, but he looked scruffy. I’d definitely 
know him if I saw him again,” the witness said. The witness also commented that the 
man had a small mole on his cheek. 
 
No Information: The witness has described the suspect as a man in his twenties. “I’d 
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